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RESURRECTING MIRANDA’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
DAVID ROSSMAN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The pedantic policeman’s Miranda warning: 
 OK. Listen up. I am going to read you your rights. You have the right to 
remain silent.1 Anything you say can be used against you.2 You have the 
right to an attorney.3 If you can’t afford one, an attorney will be appointed 
for you.4 
 Now that I’ve told you what the Supreme Court says I have to say, let me 
tell you what it really means. 
 That right to silence I told you about, it’s not exactly what it seems. It’s 
true that I can’t force you to talk. And it’s certainly true that anything you 
say can be used against you. But not much else about it is really what it 
seems. 
 For starters, I can keep asking you questions until you do make a 
statement.5 Unless you make it absolutely clear that you want to remain 
silent, by words and not by actions, nothing prevents me from keeping it 
up and getting you to say something that we can use in court.6 And you 
know what, even if you’re absolutely clear about wanting to assert this so-
called right to silence, I don’t have to listen to you.7 I can keep on trying to 
get you to make a damaging statement, and according to the Supreme 
Court, I will have done nothing wrong.8 So long as the prosecutor doesn’t 
use the statement itself, I will still be on the right side of the Constitution. 
Why would I do that? Because, even though you tried to assert your “right 
to silence,” if I ignore you and get you to tell me something that provides 
a lead to evidence I can use against you or the name of a person who can 
 
∗ Professor of Law and Director, Criminal Law Clinical Programs, Boston University 
School of Law. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 473. 
5 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010). 
6 Id. at 382. 
7 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003). 
8 Id. 
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testify against you, I can build up my case and use what I found in court.9 
Plus—and this is the icing on the cake—even if I ignore your clear and 
unequivocal statement that you want to remain silent and keep asking 
questions that finally gets you to say something useful to me, the jury will 
learn about your statement if you take the stand and testify in your own 
defense.10 
 And if you feel a little let down because the right to silence isn’t quite 
what it seems, boy, wait until I spell out what the right to an attorney means. 
The first thing I want you to know is that, just like with the right to silence, 
this so-called right to an attorney won’t even come into play unless you are 
unequivocally clear about what you want.11 And even if you have the 
presence of mind to come out with that kind of clear statement, I can ignore 
what you say, just like with the right to silence.12 Yeah, if I do ignore you 
and keep on questioning you, we can use whatever you say if you take the 
stand later,13 and we can use any leads you give us to find other evidence 
that can be introduced at trial.14 
 But that’s not the best part about this so-called right to an attorney. Even 
if you make one of those clear requests for a lawyer that most suspects find 
so hard to make, you will never, ever get an attorney to talk to you as part 
of a police interrogation. The best that will happen is that we’ll stop 
questioning you, at least until you bring up the topic of our interrogation 
again, at which point we can recommence questioning.15 But you won’t get 
a lawyer then either. There’s no way any police officer will allow a lawyer 
in the interrogation room. Buddy, you are on your own. 
Everything in this pedantic policeman’s Miranda warning is an accurate 
statement of the law. The Miranda doctrine was the product of the Warren 
Court’s lofty and, in hindsight, wildly naïve view that its four-part warning 
would make the interrogation process more fair. Since then, Miranda has been 
largely gutted at the hands of Justices who did not share their predecessors’ 
vision of the correct balance between suspects’ rights and police interrogation. 
Miranda represented the high-water mark of the criminal procedure 
revolution of the 1960s.16 The audacity of its solution to the problem of coerced 
police confessions embroiled the Supreme Court in controversy that extended 
 
9 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-43 (2004). 
10 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980). 
11 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
12 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767. 
13 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971). 
14 Patane, 542 U.S. at 639-41. 
15 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983). 
16 See Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1627 (2006) (referring to the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions as a “revolution in constitutional criminal procedure”). 
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for decades. At this point in its history, however, Miranda is bankrupt both 
intellectually and in terms of practical effect. 
Miranda, by way of what I am sure is unnecessary background, was the 
Court’s major effort to establish a proper balance between the need of the police 
in obtaining information from a suspect and respect for the suspect’s individual 
autonomy in deciding whether to cooperate. Relying on the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the controversial assumption that the environment 
inherent in police interrogation is so psychologically coercive that a universal 
antidote is needed, Miranda announced its controversial prophylactic rule.17 
Thus, Miranda requires the police to tell a suspect who is in custody four things 
prior to any interrogation: (1) you have a right to remain silent; (2) anything you 
say can be used against you; (3) you have the right to the presence of an attorney; 
and (4) if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you prior to 
any questioning.18 
The presence of a defense attorney played a key role in the Miranda Court’s 
vision of the interrogation process. “[T]he right to have counsel present at the 
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
under the system we delineate today.”19 The Court’s reasoning in Miranda 
depends on the assumption that a lawyer would actually be present to ensure that 
the suspect is protected from making a coerced confession. The Court believed 
a lawyer’s presence during interrogation was necessary to give the suspect any 
sort of meaningful opportunity to exercise the right to remain silent.20 Without 
a lawyer present, the Miranda Court was skeptical of the efficacy of the police 
telling suspects that they did not have to answer their questions.21 
Having a lawyer present, Chief Justice Warren reasoned, would also serve 
other important ends. Just having a lawyer in the room would deter the police 
from engaging in questionable tactics that may coerce a suspect into giving an 
untrustworthy statement.22 And, if the police did use an improper tactic, it would 
much more likely be exposed in court with a lawyer’s testimony than that of a 
suspect.23 If a guilty suspect decided to talk, the lawyer could ensure that the 
 
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (concluding that “the process of in-
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and that “to combat these 
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights”). 
18 Id. at 444. 
19 Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
20 See id. at 470. 
21 See id. at 469 (“Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence 
and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, 
delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among 
those who most require knowledge of their rights.”). 
22 Id. at 470. 
23 See id.  
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statement was fully accurate.24 Finally, an innocent suspect would be in a better 
position to show that the police had picked the wrong target if he or she were 
assisted by counsel.25 
To ensure that lawyers were able to play the role the Court envisioned for 
them, the Miranda opinion gave clear directions about what the police had to do 
if the suspect asked for a lawyer. The interrogation could go no further until an 
attorney was by the suspect’s side.26 The Court did recognize that the police 
would not have to have lawyers on call at every police station for the purpose of 
advising suspects during interrogation.27 The Miranda Court itself recognized 
that, even if a suspect asked for a lawyer, the police could always just terminate 
the interrogation.28 But, unless the police were to abandon interrogation as an 
investigative technique, the Court left them with the choice of either doing it 
with an attorney present or meeting the heavy burden of showing that the suspect 
“knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel.”29 The state could not meet the burden 
of showing a waiver simply from the fact that the police eventually obtained a 
confession.30 
Could the Justices have realistically thought that defense attorneys would 
become a routine part of the interrogation process? Certainly, their view of a 
defense attorney’s salutary role in the process would have inclined them to think 
so: 
An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police until he has had an 
opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his 
client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely 
exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not 
cause for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is 
merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath—to protect to 
the extent of his ability the rights of his client. In fulfilling this 
responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of 
criminal justice under our Constitution.31 
In terms of bringing about a fundamental change in the way that police 
conduct interrogations, however, Miranda was almost a dead letter on arrival. 
From its inception, no lawyers were ever actually made available to suspects 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 482. 
26 Id. at 474. 
27 Id.  
28 See id. (noting that police may refrain from providing counsel “without violating the 
person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time”). 
29 Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 480-81. 
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subject to police questioning.32 The police, not surprisingly, did not share the 
Miranda Court’s opinion of the legitimacy of a lawyer’s role in the interrogation 
room.33 The traditional law enforcement view of defense attorneys’ role in the 
interrogation process is redolent with salt allusions. “[A]ny lawyer worth his 
salt,” Justice Jackson famously said in one such reference, “will tell the suspect 
in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.”34 
Viewing defense attorneys as their mortal enemy, the police went about 
implementing Miranda by doing everything in their power to use the one way 
out that would still allow interrogation without the presence of counsel. The 
warnings had to be given in a way that minimized the chance that the suspect 
would actually choose to exercise the right to silence or ask for the help of a 
lawyer. Modern studies on Miranda show that about eighty percent of all 
suspects agree to talk without a lawyer.35 In my forty-five years as a criminal 
trial attorney, the ones who do not are overwhelming either professional 
criminals or educated people with money. Neither group is likely to be as 
intimidated by the police as those who make up the rest. The poor. The 
undereducated. The young. The members of racial and ethnic minority groups 
who fear the way the police interact with their community. 
Skilled police interrogators do not view the Miranda warnings as much of an 
impediment. The typical interrogation takes places in an environment where the 
police have total control. Everything that happens is designed to minimize the 
importance of the rights contained in the Miranda warnings and the possibility 
that the suspect will say something that will cut off the flow of questions. Before 
the interrogator gets around to asking about the crime, the conversation often 
stays on mundane topics designed to establish rapport and gain trust.36 The idea 
 
32 See Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary 
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 797 (2006) (noting that in the vast majority 
of cases where a suspect asks for an attorney, no attorney is provided because the police 
simply cease the interrogations). 
33 See id. at 797-98 (arguing that rather than waste the time securing an attorney for the 
suspect, the police will simply cease interrogations because they know that the attorney will 
just tell their client to remain silent anyways). 
34 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). The value of salt also seems to play a role in how prosecutors describe their role in 
keeping lawyers consulting with suspects. In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), the 
prosecutor in a murder case explained to the jury why the defendant’s confession, given in 
response to questioning by an Assistant District Attorney, was voluntary despite the police 
refusing to allow the defendant to see the lawyer that he requested: “You want a District 
Attorney in this county that is worth his salt, not a powder-puff District Attorney. When you 
are trying a case of murder, especially murder of a police officer, you don’t go over and give 
him a pat on the back and say, ‘Do you want anything? Do you want to have your lawyer or 
your wife or somebody else?’” Id. at 405 n.3. 
35 See Godsey, supra note 32, at 792. 
36 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey 
of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 389 (2007). 
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is to “establish a norm of friendly reciprocation.”37 The warnings themselves are 
packaged much like the adverse health effects in a pharmaceutical 
advertisement, delivered as quickly as possible in a perfunctory way.38 Moving 
from the warnings without giving the suspect any time to reflect reinforces an 
atmosphere that the suspect has no choice in the matter.39 
Miranda does nothing to curtail the sort of police interrogation tactics that are 
likely to produce false confessions. It does not prevent the police from 
pretending to have independent evidence of the suspect’s guilt, a prevalent 
ploy.40 It also does not prevent the police from making suspects believe that they 
will face harsher consequences if they do not confess, a tactic that some officers 
still admit to using occasionally.41 Where the police do obtain a confession, it is 
potent evidence that almost always leads to a conviction. That goes for false 
confessions as well.42 As of 2009, of 252 people who have been exonerated by 
DNA evidence, 42 had given false confessions.43 All were given Miranda 
warnings.44 
Miranda has become a safe harbor for the interrogation process that has 
displaced any other means of evaluating whether a confession should be 
admitted into evidence. In theory, the Due Process Clause still requires 
confessions to be voluntary, a doctrine that has traditionally considered whether 
the suspect was exercising free will in making the decision to talk to the police.45 
But, if the police have given an adequate Miranda warning and have obtained a 
 
37 George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: 
“Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 251 (2002). 
38 See id. at 250 (“One strategy is to suggest that the warnings are a mere formality to 
dispense with prior to questioning, a simple matter of routine, by delivering the warnings 
quickly in a perfunctory tone of voice or in a bureaucratic manner.”). 
39 See id. at 250-51 (listing strategies used by police interrogators designed “to trivialize 
the legal significance of Miranda, create the appearance of a nonadversarial relationship 
between the interrogators and the suspect, and communicate that the interrogator expects the 
suspect to passively execute the waiver and respond to subsequent questioning”); Kassin et 
al., supra note 36, at 383 (“[T]hey may read the rights but then proceed to question suspects 
as though they had no choice in the matter, eliciting what some courts have called an ‘implicit 
waiver.’” (citation omitted)). 
40 See Kassin et al., supra note 36, at 389. 
41 See id. 
42 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 24 (2009) (stating that in cases where 
confessions were proven false, conviction rates ranged from seventy-three to eighty-one 
percent). 
43 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1052 
(2010). 
44 Id. at 1092. 
45 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (stating that the Court has an independent 
obligation to determine whether the confession was “the product of a free and rational will” 
and thus “comports with due process”). 
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statement that will pass muster under the law that has developed since Miranda, 
the confession is almost certainly going to be found to have been voluntary.46 
In the years since the Miranda decision, the Court has made it increasingly 
easy for police to get a confession that will pass muster. In order to demonstrate 
that the suspect understood his rights and declined to exercise them, all the police 
must do is show that the suspect understood the language used to deliver the 
warnings and afterwards answered questions.47 In order to cut off questioning 
by invoking the right to silence or an attorney, the suspect has to make the kind 
of clear and unequivocal statement that powerless people in intimidating 
circumstances find practically impossible.48 And, if a suspect does indicate that 
he or she wants an attorney, subsequently making the most obscure comment on 
the topic of the investigation will open the door to the police trying again to get 
a statement.49 
What is more, in the years since Miranda, subsequent Courts have given the 
police a great deal of incentive not even to follow the decision’s relatively tepid 
mandate. The Court has held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda 
can still be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand50 or as a lead to 
further evidence that will be admissible despite its tainted origin.51 And, in the 
final insult to the vitality of Miranda, the Court has held that the police are 
generically incapable of violating the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
basis for the Miranda warnings in the first place, because the privilege only 
prevents the use of a compelled statement as evidence in a criminal trial, not the 
act of obtaining the statement.52 
The Miranda decision’s vision of the need for defense counsel to make the 
interrogation process was not misguided. Leaving the police to deliver the 
message that a suspect has rights in the interrogation process simply does not 
work. But the Miranda Court was naïve. Given what we know about the way 
that defense attorneys conceptualize their role, the police will not allow the 
attorneys into the interrogation room. Where that leaves us today is with 
Miranda as a fig leaf—it provides cover for those who would avert their eyes 
 
46 See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. McKellar, No. 88-6590, 1989 WL 90569, *2-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 
9, 1989) (reasoning that adequate Miranda warnings were sufficient to make the confession 
admissible despite the suspect being held incommunicado for five days in solitary 
confinement and taken from his cold cell only for questioning). 
47 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2011). 
48 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-62 (1994) (holding that a suspect’s 
statement “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an unambiguous request for counsel). 
49 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (stating that a suspect’s 
statement “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” was sufficient to allow the police to 
reinitiate interrogation of the suspect who had previously asked for an attorney). 
50 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
51 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-43 (2004). 
52 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003). 
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from the naked truth. But anyone with an imagination knows what is really going 
on behind closed doors. 
What I propose is a modest change in the doctrinal landscape that might 
reinvigorate Miranda and produce a fairer balance between police interrogation 
and suspects’ rights. It is the sort of proposal that could be adopted by a state 
supreme court or legislature. It would entail the following: 
1. Police would give the same Miranda warnings that they have always 
provided. 
2. The police would still operate under the same rules governing the 
legitimacy of a suspect’s decision to talk in the absence of an attorney. 
In other words, the waiver rules for Miranda rights would not change. 
3. If the police obtain a statement from a suspect without the presence of 
an attorney, then the jury would be instructed that there is a policy in 
the jurisdiction that the police should not interrogate suspects in the 
absence of a defense attorney, even with a valid waiver, and that the 
jury may take into account in evaluating the credibility of the statement 
the fact that the police did not follow this policy.53 
4. If the police do provide an attorney for the suspect during 
interrogation, then the suspect would be permitted to consult with the 
attorney, and the attorney would be given a reasonable opportunity to 
advise the suspect during the interrogation. 
5. If the suspect does not answer questions that are reasonable for 
someone in the suspect’s position at the time to respond to, then that 
information would be admissible as substantive evidence of the 
suspect’s guilt, subject to a ruling on the probative value of the 
suspect’s silence at the time of trial. 
6. If the suspect at trial maintains that his or her silence during the 
interrogation was based on the advice of the attorney, then that claim 
shall constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege insofar as it 
would otherwise protect the contents of the conversation between the 
suspect and the attorney.54 
 
53 Some jurisdictions have mandated jury instructions in other contexts when police 
interrogation does not meet a recommended standard. Massachusetts is one such jurisdiction. 
See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004) (“[W]hen the 
prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant’s confession or statement that is the product 
of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of detention (e.g., a police 
station), and there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the 
defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction advising that the State’s highest court 
has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and 
cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any recording of the interrogation in the 
case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged statement with great 
caution and care.”). 
54 This proposal is very similar to the English practice which provides solicitors for 
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The main rationale behind the proposal is pragmatism. It is not politically 
feasible to expect any jurisdiction to mandate the introduction of defense 
attorneys into the interrogation process without changing the incentives for 
attorneys to advise their clients to say absolutely nothing to the police. Nor is it 
feasible to expect any change in the current regime that allows police to operate 
under the Supreme Court’s current waiver standards. But, giving each side 
something that they do not currently get under existing interrogation doctrine 
may make this modest change possible. Under this proposal, law enforcement 
gets the ability to tell juries in some cases that a suspect refused to answer police 
questions, and defense counsel gains the ability to tell juries that the police failed 
to follow the jurisdiction’s policy preference for giving suspects a lawyer prior 
to interrogation. Defendants, meanwhile, get an actual chance of having a lawyer 
present to provide advice during the interrogation process, but only at the cost 
of the jury potentially learning of their refusal to cooperate if that is what they 
choose. 
None of the steps this proposal calls for would require jettisoning any existing 
Supreme Court precedent. But one step, offering the possibility of using a 
suspect’s refusal to answer as part of the prosecution’s case in chief, is at least 
contestable. The Supreme Court has refused on a number of occasions to provide 
a direct answer to the closely related question of whether a suspect’s refusal to 
answer an incriminating question in an uncounseled, noncustodial interrogation 
may be used as substantive evidence.55 In its most recent encounter with this 
issue in Salinas v. Texas, the Court found it unnecessary to confront this question 
because the suspect had not explicitly asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege, but 
simply remained silent.56 One can make, however, a good case that no matter 
how the Court answers the question of the use of an uncounseled suspect’s 
assertion of the privilege in a noncustodial interrogation, where counsel is 
present, the privilege does not stand in the way of the State using the suspect’s 
responses whatever they may be. 
DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT THE USE OF A COUNSELED SUSPECT’S 
SILENCE AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT? 
The Miranda decision itself seems to foreclose any proposal to allow the 
prosecution to use a suspect’s silence during police interrogation as evidence of 
guilt. Chief Justice Warren girded the Miranda warnings with self-incrimination 
 
suspects interrogated by the police and allows the prosecutor to comment on a suspect’s 
refusal to answer questions. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, c. 33, §§ 34-
35 (Eng.) (permitting inferences to be made regarding a suspect’s guilt based on the suspect’s 
silence).  
55 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (addressing only the issue of whether 
the express invocation requirement applies to noncustodial police interviews); Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232 (1980) (addressing only the issue of whether prearrest silence 
can be used to impeach a criminal defendant who chooses to testify). 
56 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184. 
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armor designed to protect those who relied on them from any taint in the jury’s 
eyes: “In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an 
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police 
custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact 
that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”57 Ten years 
later in Doyle v. Ohio,58 the Court reinforced this protection by finding a due 
process violation in impeaching a defendant’s trial testimony by evidence that 
the defendant remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning.59 
Yet, a closer examination of these two barriers reveals that neither is 
insurmountable. They each rest on basic premises that would make questionable 
their application to the situation of a suspect who remained silent during a 
custodial police interrogation where a lawyer was actually present. 
The Doyle hurdle is easier to clear, and we will look at it first. The defendants 
in Doyle were arrested after selling ten pounds of marijuana to a police 
informant.60 They both testified at trial that an aborted transaction took place, 
but that they were purchasers not vendors.61 They claimed that the informant had 
framed them.62 To impeach this testimony, the prosecutor on cross-examination 
brought out the fact that after they had been arrested and had received Miranda 
warnings, neither defendant had told this story to the police.63 
The Court’s decision in Doyle rested on an estoppel theory and how the 
government’s action affected the relevance of the defendant’s silence.64 By not 
coming forward with their story, the defendants had done exactly what the police 
invited them to do when the police told the defendants they had a right to remain 
silent. Because the police’s action in giving the Miranda warning may well have 
prompted the defendants to keep their story to themselves, it would be 
fundamentally unfair to allow the government to use the defendants’ reliance on 
what they were told as evidence of their guilt.65 Moreover, the Court reasoned, 
it would be reasonable for anyone hearing the part of the Miranda warning about 
the right to remain silent to think that if one took the police up on their word it 
would come without any penalty, including the use of silence as impeachment.66 
Not only did the Government invite the defendants to keep their story from the 
police, but by doing so the Government also robbed the defendants’ silence of a 
 
57 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (citations omitted). 
58 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
59 Id. at 618. 
60 Id. at 611. 
61 Id. at 612-13. 
62 Id. at 613. 
63 Id. at 613-14. The case also had as one of its more unlikely elements the contention that 
the informant mysteriously threw $1320 in cash into the defendants’ car. Id.  
64 See id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court’s due process rationale 
has some of the characteristics of an estoppel theory”). 
65 See id. at 618. 
66 See id. 
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substantial proportion of the value it would have in contradicting their trial 
testimony. Because the police themselves prompted the defendants to fail to tell 
them their fantastic story, their silence after being told that they need not say 
anything was too ambiguous to support the prosecutor’s attempt to use it as 
impeachment material.67 
Because the lynchpin of the Doyle doctrine is the police announcement of a 
right to remain silent, all one needs to do to avoid its consequence is to have the 
police be silent on the topic of silence. Voilà, problem solved. In a world where 
Miranda still requires police to give warnings to suspects prior to custodial 
interrogation, this insight gives prosecutors a way to impeach defendants with 
evidence of their silence only in situations where the defendants were not 
entitled to Miranda warnings. One example would be prior to a suspect’s initial 
contact with the police, where there simply is no occasion to provide a warning 
about the right to silence. This is precisely the context in which the Doyle 
problem came to the Court in Jenkins v. Anderson.68 
Dennis Jenkins testified in his murder trial that he stabbed the victim in self-
defense.69 He turned himself in to the police two weeks later.70 On cross-
examination, the prosecutor brought out the fact that in the interim between the 
stabbing and his arrest, the defendant never told the police his exculpatory 
version of the events.71 The Court not only found that Jenkins’s two weeks of 
silence was probative,72 but that there was nothing unfair about the State’s use 
of it to impeach his trial testimony. Because no government action induced 
Jenkins to remain silent, the Court held that “the fundamental unfairness present 
in Doyle is not present in this case.”73 
Jenkins, remember, involved silence prior to a suspect’s contact with the 
police. There is another time frame where the police similarly do not have to 
give a Miranda warning: after arrest but before any interrogation. The Court 
extended Jenkins to just this context in Fletcher v. Weir.74 Eric Weir seemed to 
follow the script written by Jenkins. He also got into a knife fight and killed his 
adversary.75 He also testified at trial that he acted in self-defense.76 And, he also 
 
67 See id. at 617 (“[E]very post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the 
State is required to advise the person arrested.”). 
68 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
69 Id. at 232-33. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 233-34. 
72 See id. at 239 (“Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by 
their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have 
been asserted.” (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev. 
1970))). 
73 Id. at 240. 
74 455 U.S. 603 (1982).  
75 Id. at 603-04. 
76 Id. at 603. 
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never told the police his version of the events.77 But, unlike Jenkins, Weir was 
not only asked on cross-examination why he did not go to the police and report 
the killing, but also why he never told the police after he was arrested that he 
acted in self-defense.78 Critical to the Court’s resolution of the issue was the fact 
that Weir never “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he 
remained silent immediately after his arrest.”79 Absent an affirmative assurance 
from the government that Weir could remain silent without any penalty, the 
Court saw nothing unfair about using Weir’s postarrest silence to impeach him.80 
And, because Weir was not relying on an express invitation to keep his story to 
himself, the use of the inconsistency between his silence and his trial testimony 
was more reasonable.81 
Given the extent to which Miranda warnings have pervaded the national 
consciousness through myriad television cop shows and movies, one might 
question the soundness of a distinction based on the police telling a suspect 
something that probably every American over the age of ten knows by heart.82 
Indeed, it is fairly common for defendants to tell their lawyers about their 
outrage at the fact that they were not “given their rights.” Now, there is nothing 
wrong with police withholding a Miranda warning when they have made an 
arrest. Miranda only requires the warning as a predicate to interrogation, and if 
the police do not ask questions about the crime, then they do not have to recite 
the Miranda rights. But, if one wanted to ensure that even those who did not 
receive a Miranda warning were not misled about the consequences of 
remaining silent, there is a simple fix to this problem as well. Someone could 
simply inform the suspect of the pros and cons of not answering police questions. 
And who better to do that than defense counsel? 
If a defendant were given access to a lawyer during police questioning in a 
regime where one’s silence might be admissible at trial, one of the things the 
 
77 Id. at 603-04. 
78 Compare Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 233 (reciting the cross-examination of the defendant, 
which focused on why the defendant had not gone to the police with his version of the events 
sooner), with Weir, 455 U.S. at 603 (noting that the in-court statement regarding self-defense 
“was the first occasion on which respondent offered an exculpatory version of the stabbing” 
and the prosecution cross-examined him as to why he had not advanced his self-defense claim 
sooner). 
79 Weir, 455 U.S. at 605. 
80 Id. at 607 (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda 
warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-
examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”). 
81 See id. (“A State is entitled, in such situations, to leave to the judge and jury under its 
own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed 
to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”). 
82 See State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 335, at ¶ 34 
(“With the proliferation of movies and television shows portraying the criminal justice 
system, it would be difficult to find a person living in America who has not heard of Miranda 
warnings.”). 
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lawyer would do would be to advise the client on precisely this issue. The lawyer 
would point out the advantages and disadvantages of cooperating with the 
police. And one of the advantages would be avoiding the possibility that the jury 
would learn of the client’s refusal to answer questions. 
So long as a suspect has not been left with the misconception that remaining 
silent carries no penalty, the due process problem that Doyle presents is not 
relevant. And a major benefit that lawyers provide for clients is to disabuse them 
of misconceptions about the criminal justice system. 
However, the barrier to the proposal allowing a suspect’s counseled silence 
to be used as evidence based on the privilege is more daunting. The rationale for 
the Court’s conclusion, that using a suspect’s silence is an impermissible penalty 
on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, does not have any 
traction when an attorney is sitting next to a suspect in an interrogation. In order 
to see why, let us first examine the rationale for Chief Justice Warren’s statement 
in Miranda. 
The idea that the State may not penalize people who exercise the privilege by 
referring to their silence at trial comes from Griffin v. California,83 the case on 
which Miranda relied for this proposition.84 Griffin involved a murder trial 
where the defendant did not take the stand.85 Both the prosecutor and the judge, 
following a provision in the California Constitution that made it fair game for 
both to comment on the failure of the defendant to explain or deny the evidence 
against him,86 pointed out that the only surviving witness to the events 
surrounding the victim’s death was the defendant who chose not to tell the jury 
what had happened.87 The prosecutor and judge’s solemnizing the significance 
of the defendant’s failure to take the stand, Griffin held, was “a penalty imposed 
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege 
by making its assertion costly.”88 
 
83 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
84 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). 
85 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609. 
86 See id. at 610 n.2 (“Article I, § 13, of the California Constitution provides in part: ‘ . . . in 
any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by 
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the 
court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.’”). 
87 See id. at 610-11.The trial judge’s instructions to the jury included the following: 
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected 
to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, 
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that 
failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as 
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those 
unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable. 
Id. at 610. 
88 Id. at 614. The opinion went on to explain: “What the jury may infer, given no help from 
the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
into evidence against him is quite another.” Id. 
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The defendants in Griffin and Miranda were both exercising the privilege 
against self-incrimination when they remained silent in their respective contexts. 
The defendant in Griffin was taking advantage of the special rule concerning the 
privilege that applies to a defendant in his or her own criminal trial. A prosecutor 
(or a co-defendant if the case is tried jointly) cannot even call the defendant to 
the stand.89 The basis for this exception is the negative inference most jurors 
would likely draw from the fact that the defendant explicitly refused to answer 
the prosecutor’s pointed questions.90 Staying off the stand was precisely what 
the privilege allowed Eddie Griffin to do. So asking the jury to draw a negative 
inference from that behavior imposed a cost on the exercise of a constitutionally 
protected right. 
The people who were the objects of the Court’s solicitude in Miranda—
suspects in police custody who are subject to interrogation—are also exercising 
a constitutionally protected right. That is because of the Court’s assumption 
about the effect of the police-dominated environment in which they find 
themselves. “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the 
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,” Chief Justice Warren famously 
proclaimed, “no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product 
of his free choice.”91 The highly suspect empirical assertion implicit in this 
statement and the resulting prophylactic nature of the remedy the Court 
prescribed have led to much controversy. But taken on its face, the assumption 
about the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation means that 
suspects in custody do not have to affirmatively assert the privilege to gain its 
benefit. If a suspect in police custody makes an incriminating statement in 
response to a question, the statement will be excluded at trial on the grounds of 
the privilege without a judge looking to see what actually motivated the answer. 
By virtue of the Miranda Court’s amateur psychology, compulsion must be 
presumed in custodial interrogations. 
It should be clear by now why it was natural for the Miranda Court to use the 
Griffin principle, which condemned imposing costs on the exercise of the 
privilege, as the reason why a prosecutor could not use at trial the fact that a 
suspect remained silent in the face of an accusation. Remaining silent during 
custodial interrogation is what the privilege allows one to do. If asking the jury 
to draw a negative inference from the exercise of the privilege in the context of 
refusing to take the stand is prohibited, as in Griffin, then the same negative 
inference regarding the exercise of the privilege in the context of police 
interrogation should also be prohibited. 
 
89 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1983) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 
70, 77 (1973)). 
90 Cf. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 185-88 (1963) (discussing the probability that 
jurors would draw a negative inference from the fact that prosecution witnesses claimed the 
privilege on cross-examination to questions about their participation in criminal conduct 
together with the defendant). 
91 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966). 
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This equation changes, however, when the interrogation takes place in the 
presence of an attorney. The Miranda Court’s underlying psychological 
assumption about the pressure a suspect faces in a police-dominated 
environment no longer fits. It would be disingenuous to conclude that the 
presence of the very antidote to police pressure, a defense attorney, did not 
remove the coercion that custodial police interrogation would otherwise entail. 
In short, when a suspect with a lawyer present remains silent at a custodial 
interrogation, one cannot conclude by virtue of Miranda’s logic that the silence 
represents an exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. It is a different 
kind of silence. Which leads us to the next question we must confront: Does 
every act of silence in the face of police questioning entail an exercise of the 
privilege against self-incrimination? 
Not every person who remains silent is doing something the Constitution 
protects. Silence is a funny sort of right. Of course, we all have the power within 
us to remain silent whenever we want. So to say we have a right to silence clearly 
cannot mean that the Constitution guarantees us the ability to do something we 
otherwise could not do, like vote. We cannot vote without some affirmative act 
on the part of the government allowing us to engage in the act of voting. We do 
not need the government to do anything like that to allow us to remain silent. So 
clearly, what a right to silence must mean is that if we remain silent under some, 
or all, circumstances, we not only have the power to do so but also have a 
normative claim that it is proper to do so. And, having a normative claim against 
the State to exercise a right means that the State is under a corresponding duty 
not simply to allow us to exercise that right, but to avoid interfering with us 
when we do.92 
That is where the concept of compulsion comes into play. What the privilege 
gives us is not a generalized right granted to us by the State to remain silent, but 
a right to have the State not use compulsion to get us to give up our power to 
exercise silence. If you think you have a generalized right to remain silent that 
governs all of your interactions with government officials, try it out. When you 
are appointed to the federal bench and a future colleague administers the oath 
asking you to swear to uphold the Constitution, remain silent and see what 
happens. Even if your silence was based on a fear that anything you said in 
response to the oath would require you to admit your commitment to the violent 
overthrow of the government (which we can assume under some circumstances 
would be an incriminating statement), I would not count on your chances of 
convincing anyone you were entitled to the job because of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
The language of the privilege rings the bell of compulsion, not silence. It 
guarantees only that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
 
92 See Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 817-18 (1957) (discussing how the word 
“rights” is a conclusory term for expressing the normative judgment that a particular person 
in a particular setting is entitled to do or receive a particular thing). 
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witness against himself.”93 The Court has consistently adhered to, and 
sometimes quoted, the view of Leonard Levy about this aspect of the privilege: 
“The element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the 
right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating 
interrogatories.”94 Miranda did not require police to tell a suspect that you have 
“the right to remain silent”95 because that is an accurate general description of 
what the privilege provides. It required police to give suspects this information 
because the suspects were going to be questioned in an environment where the 
Court concluded compulsion was an inherent part of the environment. That is 
why the Chief Justice does not warn the incoming President of a right to silence 
before administering the oath of office. Nor does a police officer have to give 
you a Miranda warning unless you are in custody, because it is only when 
suspects are in a custodial environment that the Court is willing to presume that 
suspects cannot resist police compulsion to answer questions.96 
Justice Stevens was the foremost proponent of this view of the privilege. He 
explained his position in Jenkins, in which he concluded “the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to 
remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak.”97 Where a 
defendant remained silent at his trial, Justice Stevens understood that an exercise 
of the privilege was involved.98 But in the prearrest context where the suspect is 
under no official compulsion to speak or remain silent, a voluntary decision to 
do one or the other does not raise any issue under the privilege.99 That being the 
 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
94 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, 
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328 (1968)); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of 
N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (“The constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination has two primary interrelated facets: The Government may not use compulsion 
to elicit self-incriminating statements; and the Government may not permit the use in a 
criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion.” (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted)). 
95 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
96 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-42 (1984) (framing the issue of 
custody in the case as “whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that 
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that 
he be warned of his constitutional rights” and concluding that a traffic stop did not constitute 
custody under this formulation). 
97 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted). 
98 Id. at 242.  
99 Id. at 243-44. Justice Stevens’s concurrence did contain language that some have 
maintained strip it of any support for its application to the situation where the suspect is 
represented by counsel during police interrogation. See State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 554-
55 (Minn. 2011) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion is clearly tied to the facts 
of that case, in which the defendant’s silence came before any contact with the police.”). 
Distinguishing the prearrest context presented by the facts in Jenkins from a trial where a 
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case, if a defendant’s silence was otherwise probative, a prosecutor could 
introduce it at trial either for impeachment or as substantive evidence of guilt.100 
There is, however, one small problem with Justice Stevens’s explanation. He 
essentially hid the rabbit he pulled out of the hat by assuming that there is no 
official compulsion to speak if remaining silent means that the prosecutor can 
use your silence to impeach you should you be charged with a crime and take 
the stand in your own defense. He never addressed the question of whether the 
threat of using one’s silence is, itself, prohibited under the privilege. There are 
consequences that the State may not attach to a person’s decision not to reveal 
potentially incriminating information. The paradigmatic historical example is 
putting someone behind bars for contempt.101 If the state put someone in the 
 
defendant remains silent, Justice Stevens stated: “The fact that a citizen has a constitutional 
right to remain silent when he is questioned has no bearing on the probative significance of 
his silence before he has any contact with the police.” Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). The reference to a right to remain silent when questioned has to be understood 
in the context of the discussion which preceded it, and that discussion concerned the 
application of the privilege at trial and not a general right to silence whenever faced with a 
question. See id. at 242. Indeed, Justice Stevens went on to say: “[I]n determining whether 
the privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in a position to have his 
testimony compelled and then asserted his privilege, not simply whether he was silent. A 
different view ignores the clear words of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 244. The logic of 
Justice Stevens’s position applies whether someone has been arrested or not. Because Jenkins 
only presented the Court with the problem of how to apply the privilege to someone who had 
not yet been arrested, there was no reason for Justice Stevens to opine about how the issue 
should be resolved in other contexts. Thus, it is a very shaky leap from his reference to the 
significance of silence before contact with the police to the conclusion that the analysis would 
be different afterwards. 
100 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 244 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Under my approach, assuming 
relevance, the evidence could have been used not only for impeachment but also in rebuttal 
even had petitioner not taken the stand.”). 
101 See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (“[A] District Court cannot 
compel Conboy to answer deposition questions over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time.”). The list of other 
government sanctions that may not be attached to an individual’s silence contains: 
 The imposition of the loss of a government benefit, such as a job or a license to engage 
in a profession. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977) 
(addressing loss of position as a political party official); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 
70, 83 (1973) (addressing loss of eligibility as a public contractor); Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (addressing loss of employment as a police officer). 
 The revocation of probation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) 
(stating in dicta that “if the State . . . asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead 
to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the 
failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would 
be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution”). 
 A criminal sanction for failing to provide information outside of trial context where 
the information provides definitive evidence of guilt. See Marchetti v. United States, 
390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968) (holding that the privilege protects a taxpayer who refuses to 
file a gambling tax return or register as a gambler, because the information in those 
  
1146 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1129 
 
position of either making a potentially incriminating statement or going to jail, 
the privilege would not be “simply irrelevant” because there would be 
compulsion involved. Justice Stevens never explained why the same cannot be 
said when the State places people in the position of either making a potentially 
incriminating statement or having their silence used to impeach them. 
It turns out that the majority in Jenkins did address this problem, although not 
in an altogether straightforward way. In fact, the majority expressly noted it was 
not deciding the application of the privilege to prearrest silence.102 But it did 
provide some support for the proposition that silence where one is not under any 
other type of compulsion to answer is fair game for the prosecutor at trial.103 The 
majority in Jenkins instead disposed of the privilege question on waiver grounds. 
The Court reasoned that even if the defendant’s prearrest silence were an 
invocation of the privilege, by taking the stand and testifying the defendant 
waived his right to keep that fact from the jury.104 In reaching this result, the 
majority applied a waiver rule announced in the 1926 case of Raffel v. United 
States.105 An examination of Raffel suggests a way of viewing waiver that would 
allow the prosecution to use a counselled defendant’s silence during 
interrogation as substantive evidence at trial. 
Raffel involved a defendant whose first trial ended with a hung jury.106 He 
was retried and convicted. At both trials, a prohibition agent testified that the 
defendant admitted to owning the speakeasy where the liquor was found.107 
Before the first jury, the defendant did not take the stand.108 At the second trial, 
the defendant did testify and denied making the admission to the prohibition 
 
forms would incriminate him). 
 The use of an exercise of the privilege at trial as substantive evidence. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “forbids 
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court 
that such silence is evidence of guilt”). 
 The automatic imposition of a quasicriminal sanction. See Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 634, 637-38 (1886) (addressing forfeiture of goods).  
102 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2 (“Our decision today does not consider whether or 
under what circumstances prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
103 See id. at 240 (“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent 
before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and 
given Miranda warnings. . . . We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
104 See id. at 235 (“[T]he immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may 
waive by offering himself as a witness. . . . When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does 
so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-
examined . . . .” (quoting Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926))). 
105 Id. 




2017] RESURRECTING MIRANDA’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1147 
 
agent.109 On cross-examination, the prosecutor brought out the fact that at the 
previous trial the defendant chose not to testify.110 The Raffel Court viewed the 
problem through the lens of the general rule that when a defendant takes the 
stand he or she must answer all the prosecutor’s relevant questions.111 The 
defendant, in other words, cannot claim the privilege on cross-examination.112 
But the Court was not completely blind to the tension between the general rule 
and the special case where the relevant question concerns a prior invocation of 
the privilege.113 
In a brief discussion that in some ways foreshadowed the Griffin concept of a 
cost on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, Raffel considered 
whether the prosecutor’s comment in the second trial could have impermissibly 
burdened the defendant’s choice to remain silent at the first.114 The explanation 
the Court gave tells us why use of a prior invocation of the privilege for 
impeachment may not be the type of compulsion the privilege prohibits. 
The Raffel Court recognized that a defendant’s decision to exercise the 
privilege and stay off the stand is made more difficult if he or she must factor in 
the possibility of some future prosecutor using that fact on cross-examination.115 
But the Court found no significant difference between this amount of pressure 
and the inevitable cost of remaining silent inherent in any trial. If a defendant 
chooses not to testify, there is always the possibility that the jury, despite an 
instruction to the contrary, will draw a negative inference from the defendant’s 
choice.116 Even if the privilege prevented cross-examination on a prior 
invocation, there would still be pressure on a defendant to testify arising from 
the defendant’s calculation of how the jury would react if there were a second 
trial.117 In essence, the Raffel Court determined that allowing the prosecutor to 
use a prior invocation imposed only an insignificant cost on the exercise of the 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. The cross-examination also gave the defendant an opportunity to explain why he 
chose not to testify, which the defendant did, saying that he did not see a reason to testify 
before because he thought the evidence against him was not strong enough to convict. Id. 
111 See id. at 497. 
112 See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (discussing how the decision 
to testify constitutes a waiver of the privilege with respect to the subject matter of the 
testimony and the scope of the “waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-
examination”). 
113 See Raffel, 271 U.S. at 497. The Court conceded, without deciding, that if the defendant 
had not taken the stand, his prior invocation of the privilege would not have been admissible. 
Id. But, it explained this result on the ground that this type of evidence would lack any 
probative value, not on the basis of any policy behind the privilege. Id. 
114 See id. at 498-99. 
115 See id. What a defendant must take into account is the convergence of three future 
events: (1) the current proceeding ending in a mistrial, (2) the case being retried, and (3) the 
defendant making the decision to testify in the second trial.  
116 See id. at 499. 
117 See id. 
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privilege. “We are unable to see that the rule that if he testifies, he must testify 
fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable embarrassment which 
the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or not.”118 
What we learn from Raffel, therefore, is that not every detriment associated with 
remaining silent is forbidden. Silence has its own inherent costs and only if the 
State substantially adds to that baseline does the privilege stand in the way. 
The Jenkins majority could have just cited Raffel and stopped there to support 
its conclusion that the defendant’s decision to take the stand waived any 
privilege against self-incrimination. But it didn’t. The opinion went on to use the 
Raffel analysis and compare other situations to the type of pressure that the use 
of silence for impeachment imposes.119 
In the years after Raffel, the Court considered a number of additional contexts 
where the defendant’s choice to remain silent comes at a price. The Jenkins 
majority relied on two particular contexts. One had to do with capital murder 
cases featured in the Court’s joint decision in McGautha v. California.120 In 
some jurisdictions, defendants charged with capital murder have the same jury 
decide both the question of guilt and the question of whether to impose the death 
penalty in a unitary trial. Defendants in this situation are faced with a similar 
choice to the defendant in Jenkins. Defendants in a Jenkins context must weigh 
remaining silent against the prospect of being impeached if they testify. 
Defendants in a McGautha context must weigh remaining silent on the question 
of guilt against the lost opportunity to present through their own testimony 
mitigating information on the issue of sentencing. 
In McGautha, the Court held that “the policies of the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case 
yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging 
his case on guilt.”121 Even considering “the peculiar poignancy of the position 
of a man whose life is at stake,”122 the Court held that the state may make the 
price of silence the loss of an opportunity personally to plead one’s case on the 
issue of punishment. That establishes another benchmark against which to 
measure the effect of using otherwise noncompelled silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt. 
Jenkins also held out another example of a permissible type of pressure a state 
may bring to bear on someone who refuses to make an incriminating statement: 
plea-bargaining. As authority for the proposition that not every type of pressure 
to abandon a constitutional right is invalid, Jenkins cited Corbitt v. New 
 
118 Id. 
119 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1980). 
120 See id. at 236 n.3 (discussing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)). 
121 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 217. 
122 Id. at 216. 
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Jersey,123 which upheld a statute that rewarded defendants who pled guilty with 
immunity from the maximum sentence for the crime of murder.124 
Think about what is involved in a guilty plea. It is the paramount exercise of 
self-incrimination. By contrast, the entry of a plea of not guilty is a constitutive 
act of invoking the privilege. And so, at bottom, plea bargaining is all about the 
use of state power to get the defendant to abandon the privilege and incriminate 
himself. Corbitt, and the earlier guilty plea cases on which it relied,125 made it 
legitimate for the state to make a defendant bear the risk of receiving a harsher 
sentence if the defendant refused an offer to plead guilty.126 Corbitt noted that 
the Court had retreated from the high water mark of the Griffin principle 
prohibiting a cost on the exercise of the privilege. “[N]ot every burden on the 
exercise of a constitutional right,” the Court noted, “and not every pressure or 
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”127 
The plea-bargaining cases set another benchmark. If the State may force a 
defendant who exercises the privilege to bear the risk that the defendant may 
receive a sentence drastically more severe, does it exceed “in any substantial 
manner,” to use the test from Raffel, the burden of having one’s counseled 
silence used as substantive evidence?128 
There are other contexts in which the Court has been called upon to establish 
the permissible limits on how the state may react to someone’s silence. Let us 
take a look at them and see how they compare to the proposal at hand. 
The Court has addressed the evidentiary use of silence, aside from the 
impeachment context that Jenkins considered. In Baxter v. Palmigiano129 the 
Court dealt with whether a prison disciplinary hearing could draw an adverse 
inference from a prisoner remaining silent during the process.130 The Court held 
that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state’s use of someone’s silence 
as evidence in a non-criminal case.131 Several aspects of the prison disciplinary 
 
123 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 220 (1978)). 
124 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 220. 
125 See id. (discussing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)). 
126 In Brady, the Court upheld a guilty plea that the defendant entered that ensured a 
lengthy prison sentence rather than the defendant going to trial and facing the prospect of the 
death penalty. Brady, 397 U.S. at 744-45. In Bordenkircher, the Court upheld a life sentence 
after the defendant was convicted following his refusal of a plea offer that would have entailed 
only five years in prison. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 366. And in Corbitt, the defendant went 
to trial and received a mandatory life sentence rather than enter a guilty plea which would 
have made him eligible for a term of not more than thirty years. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 212, 216. 
127 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218. 
128 Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926). 
129 425 U.S. 308, 310 (1976). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 320. The stakes at issue in Baxter involved a term of thirty days in “punitive 
segregation” and a downgrade in his classification status. See id. at 312-13.  
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proceedings it considered led the Court to conclude that drawing an adverse 
inference did not contravene the privilege.132 First, and the most crucial, was that 
the hearing in which the inference played a role was not a criminal case.133 The 
long-standing rule applying the privilege in civil cases is that a party may claim 
the privilege but may not escape an adverse inference from refusing to answer a 
question.134 In civil cases, where the stakes are not as high and where the 
condemnation that accompanies conviction of a crime is not at issue, a Griffin 
rule is unnecessary.135 Second, the Court in Baxter relied on the fact that the 
inmate’s silence did not automatically result in the imposition of the disciplinary 
sanction.136 It would just form part of the entire record and be given whatever 
weight its probative value commanded.137 This second factor distinguished 
Baxter from a line of cases dealing with situations in which individuals who 
refused to answer potentially incriminating questions outside the context of a 
criminal trial were automatically subject to the loss of some government benefit. 
In the first of the automatic penalty cases, Garrity v. New Jersey,138 police 
officers suspected of criminal activity by their superiors were questioned by the 
Attorney General’s Office.139 The interrogation proceeded under the terms of a 
statute that provided that any public employee who refused to answer questions 
based on the privilege “upon matters relating to the . . . employment . . . shall 
thereby forfeit his . . . employment.”140 The Court held that the threat of being 
fired constituted “a form of compulsion,” and thus the privilege prevented the 
use of the statements the officers made at their subsequent criminal trial.141 In 
explaining its result, the Court compared what happens when a state puts public 
employees to the choice between self-incrimination or loss of their livelihood to 
the plight facing suspects undergoing police custodial interrogation.142 In both 
situations, the Court reasoned, the context in which the state has placed the 
person it wants to question “is ‘likely to exert such pressure upon an individual 
as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.’”143 This sweeping 
generalization may be questionable psychology, in the Miranda context as well 
as in Garrity. But, it does give us a way to identify what Fifth Amendment 
 
132 Id. at 317. 
133 Id. at 316. 
134 Id. at 318 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 439 (McNaughton rev. 
1961)). 
135 Id. at 319. 
136 Id. at 331. 
137 Id. at 317-18. 
138 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
139 Id. at 494. 
140 Id. at 494-95 n.1 (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965)). 
141 Id. at 497. 
142 Id. (“The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-
incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent.”). 
143 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-465 (1966)). 
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compulsion means. The state may not force someone to choose between self-
incrimination and the automatic loss of something as important to them as their 
job. The immediacy and magnitude of the consequence are necessary 
ingredients. 
The other automatic penalty cases the Court noted in Baxter all followed this 
pattern.144 For example, in Lefkowitz v. Turley,145 architects who claimed the 
privilege before a grand jury were automatically disqualified from government 
contracts.146 The Court held that the New York statute that imposed this 
consequence violated the privilege, because the “threat of substantial economic 
sanction” constituted compulsion just as would the threat of imprisonment for 
contempt.147 
The state’s use of a person’s silence in the face of a government accusation 
also played a role in Brogan v. United States.148 Brogan addressed the validity 
of the “exculpatory no” defense to a charge of making false statements.149 An 
“exculpatory no” means that if someone makes a simple denial of an accusation 
of wrongdoing to a federal agent, it is not a violation of the statute that makes it 
a crime to make a materially false representation to a federal agency on a matter 
within their jurisdiction.150 One of the arguments in support of the “exculpatory 
no” defense was based on a common metaphor found in the jurisprudence of the 
privilege: the “cruel trilemma.”151 
The trilemma is essentially a three sided catch-22.152 The phrase, as applied 
to the privilege, originated in Justice Goldberg’s opinion in Murphy v. 
 
144 Baxter also relied on the companion cases of Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 
(1968), and Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). 
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 329-30. In Gardner, the Court held that New York City could not fire a 
police officer solely because he asserted the privilege and refused to answer questions before 
a grand jury. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79. The Court held that the “penalty of the loss of 
employment” constituted coercion. Id. at 279. In Sanitation Men, which also involved city 
employees who refused to testify before a grand jury and were fired solely for that reason, the 
result was the same. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284 (applying Gardner). 
145 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
146 Id. at 71-73. 
147 Id. at 82; see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) (finding it would 
violate the privilege for a state automatically to revoke probation of a probationer who refused 
to answer incriminating questions put to him by a probation officer in a noncustodial setting); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation where 
the court in a quasi-criminal forfeiture action treated an invocation of the privilege in response 
to a document request as a concession of liability).  
148 522 U.S. 398, 399 (1998). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 401; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (outlining the crime of false representation 
to a federal agency). 
151 Id. at 404. 
152 See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961) (illustrating a set of paradoxical 
requirements whereby airmen mentally unfit to fly did not have to do so, but could not actually 
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Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,153 where he used it to explain the 
plight of a witness testifying in front of a tribunal with contempt power.154 The 
“cruel trilemma” that required the protection of the privilege consisted of three 
unpalatable options: “self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”155 
It is easy to see how the trilemma applies to the paradigmatic example of the 
privilege: the situation of a grand jury witness asked an incriminating question. 
If the witness answered truthfully, then she has provided inculpatory testimonial 
evidence to the prosecutor, which is precisely the type of result the privilege is 
designed to prevent. If the witness lies, then she exposes herself to prosecution 
for perjury. And if the witness remains silent, she will be jailed for contempt. 
The solution to the trilemma is to give its victim the right to remain silent without 
the possibility of going to jail for contempt, thus avoiding each of its perils. 
In Brogan, the petitioner, a union official, met with agents from the IRS and 
the Department of Labor and falsely said “no” to a question about whether he 
had received any money from an employer for whom his union members 
worked.156 The conundrum that the union official said he faced when he 
contemplated his answer was the equivalent of the trilemma.157 If he answered 
the question truthfully, he would incriminate himself. If he lied, he would be 
subjecting himself to jail for committing perjury. And silence, he contended, was 
not a viable choice because anyone in his situation would fear that the act of 
remaining silent would be used against him in the future.158 The only solution 
that would allow him to avoid the perils of the trilemma, he maintained, was to 
give him the option of an “exculpatory no.” Justice Scalia’s response was telling. 
“It is well established that the fact that a person’s silence can be used against 
him—either as substantive evidence of guilt or to impeach him if he takes the 
stand—does not exert a form of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful 
lie.”159 
Now, we can circle back to the proposal that would allow a prosecutor the 
right to use as evidence a defendant’s assertion of the privilege at an 
interrogation where counsel was present. Is the threat of the use of a suspect’s 
silence the type of pressure that meets the definition of compulsion that the 




153 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
154 Id. at 54 (“[A]bsent an immunity provision, one jurisdiction in our federal structure 
may compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of 
another jurisdiction.”). 
155 Id. at 55. 
156 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 399. 
157 Id. at 404. 
158 Id. at 405. 
159 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The ordinary course of everyday life sometimes presents people with an 
awkward choice of either admitting something embarrassing or remaining silent. 
This dilemma may even be freighted with an accusation of criminality. Consider 
a conversation between a man and a woman after a night of drinking that 
culminated in a sexual encounter. Let’s call them Alice and Ted. Alice calls Ted 
the next morning and says: “Oh Ted. How could you? You knew I had too much 
to drink last night. You knew I couldn’t give any type of real consent. What you 
did was rape, wasn’t it?” Ted is in the position of facing an accusation of a 
serious crime. Let’s say he remains silent; hangs up the phone, in fact. Would 
there be anything in this encounter that would conceivably give Ted the right to 
prevent on the grounds of the privilege some future prosecutor from introducing 
this exchange into evidence as proof of Ted’s guilty knowledge? Ted may say 
that he was exercising his generalized right to silence by his response to Alice’s 
accusation. But it hardly seems likely that the Fifth Amendment privilege was 
adopted in order to overturn the established common law rule that silence in the 
face of an accusation is probative evidence.160 The Constitution was not adopted 
to regulate the ordinary rules of conversation between ordinary citizens, even 
when it contains grave accusations. It may be that the rules of evidence would 
not allow the use of Ted’s silence in this situation, but the privilege against self-
incrimination would not play a role in the analysis. 
Now, one might say that because Ted did not explicitly assert the privilege on 
hearing Alice’s accusation, there’s an independent reason why it would not play 
a role in any future criminal trial. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Salinas stands for just this proposition.161 But a simple change in the scenario 
would allow Ted to avoid being caught on the horns of Salinas. Instead of 
remaining silent when Alice finished her accusation, he simply could have said 
“Well, Alice, I’ll take the Fifth on that one.” That simple, though inelegant, 
statement would be enough to invoke the protection of the privilege if it 
otherwise applied.162 But it would not make Ted’s claim any more grounded in 
the Constitution. You cannot cloak yourself in the mantle of the privilege just 
because you would like its protection. You cannot prevent your employer from 
firing you, for example, if you refuse to answer a question about why your 
expense account lists $25,000 worth of charges for an escort service. In order to 
prevent yourself from suffering an adverse consequence because you have 
refused to answer a potentially incriminating question, you have to find yourself 
in a situation to which the privilege is directed. Interactions between private 
employers and their employees do not count and neither do conversations 
between ordinary people. These interactions do not present the sort of danger 
 
160 For the history of the evidentiary doctrine that a tacit admission is admissible as 
evidence of guilt, see generally Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Standing Mute at 
Arrest as Evidence of Guilt: The “Right to Silence” Under Attack, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2007). 
161 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180-83 (2013). 
162 See Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “I’ll take 
the Fifth” is synonymous with asserting the privilege against self-incrimination). 
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that led to the adoption of the privilege. The state is not using its monopoly on 
the use of coercive instruments of power to force individuals to reveal 
incriminating information. 
If the interaction between Alice and Ted does, as I contend, establish a base 
line from which the state may avoid any barrier to the use of Ted’s purported 
shield of the privilege, consider how, if at all, the situation would change if Alice 
first went to the police. It would be a relatively conventional investigative 
technique in that situation for the police to ask Alice to call Ted on the telephone 
and try to get an admission from him that he had sex with her when she was too 
intoxicated to consent. The conversation might, in fact, proceed exactly as 
before, with Ted responding that he wants to “take the Fifth.” Two things are 
clear from this new scenario. One is that now Alice is no longer just acting as an 
ordinary citizen. She is, effectively, an agent of the State. And the other is that 
from Ted’s point of view, nothing has changed. If he was in a situation before 
that did not present him with the sort of compulsion that the privilege is designed 
to prevent the state from using to obtain an incriminating statement, he must be 
just as unencumbered in the second scenario. 
Would the privilege prevent the state from using Ted’s comment if Alice were 
working as a police agent? Would the pressure on Ted to respond, rise to the 
level of coercion under the privilege? Comparing it to the baseline context where 
Alice is just an ordinary citizen, the answer is no. The situations are essentially 
the same. Ted feels no more pressure to talk than is inevitable as an ordinary 
consequence of social life. 
There is another aspect of Ted’s situation that also points in the direction of 
the conclusion that he does not fall within the ambit of the privilege. The 
prospect that the potential cost he faces—the substantive use of his response at 
a future criminal trial—is by no means automatic. It depends on a number of 
contingencies: whether he is charged with a crime and whether a judge would 
allow the prosecutor to introduce Ted’s response into evidence in the face of a 
challenge based on the rules of evidence.163 We have seen that the immediacy 
of the penalty plays a key role in the analysis of whether it constitutes the sort 
of compulsions that the privilege prohibits. It is not part of the picture for Ted. 
Would the future use of a suspect’s silence be sufficiently coercive to rise to 
the level of compulsion that the privilege prevents if the suspect made his or her 
choice in a police interrogation where counsel was present? Let us look at the 
features of the environment where this question would arise. First of all, we have 
seen that no one can insulate himself or herself from the pressure of having to 
face the possibility of seeing a refusal to respond to an accusation of wrongdoing 
be used in some future criminal trial. It is a fact of social life that the privilege 
does not alter. Whether you are talking to your employer or someone who thinks 
he or she is a victim of a crime you committed, you cannot escape the possibility 
 
163 See generally Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little: 
Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21 (2008) (detailing 
the various ways that silence is used as evidence). 
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that your refusal to respond to an accusation will find itself as part of some 
prosecutor’s case in chief. Some pressure to respond is part of everyone’s 
baseline. 
Second, it would no longer be appropriate to apply the Miranda presumption 
that the suspect was in an inherently coercive environment. The very presence 
of counsel would dispel the pressure that the police would otherwise bring to 
bear. The Court’s conclusion that compulsion was inherent in custodial 
interrogation specifically relies on the absence of counsel as a necessary 
ingredient. “The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be 
the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police 
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure 
that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the 
product of compulsion.”164 
Third, the pressure facing the suspect to make a statement, which comes from 
the potential future evidentiary use of a refusal to answer, is by no means 
automatic. It may or may not come to pass. 
And, fourth, as in the plea-bargaining context, the suspect is not left to his or 
her own devices in making the decision about how to weigh the choice to speak 
or remain silent. With the assistance of counsel, while the decision may not be 
an easy one, it is likely to be a thoughtful, considered choice. 
These four features of an interrogation where the suspect was actually given 
the assistance of counsel make it difficult to conclude that the type of 
compulsion that the privilege was designed to prevent is actually present. A 
prosecutor’s use of the suspect’s silence as part of the government’s case in chief 
would not be imposing a cost of the exercise of the privilege because the act of 
silence would not have taken place in an environment where government 
compulsion was part of the picture. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the question of the proper role for counsel in the police 
interrogation environment, we are not writing on a clean slate. Miranda created 
a chimera that serves neither the vast majority of suspects who are interrogated 
nor the integrity of the criminal justice system in holding out a false promise. 
Any proposal that actually provides attorneys for the approximately eighty 
percent of suspects who choose to talk with the police without invoking the 
magical words that will cut off questioning can only be an advantage to those 
who believe, as did the original Miranda Court, that attorneys do make the 
process fairer. Miranda recognized that its solution to the problem of the 
inherent pressure of the police-dominated interrogation process was not the only 
possibility and left it open for the states to experiment.165 The proposal outlined 
 
164 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). 
165 Id. at 490 (finding that both “Congress and the states are free to develop their own 
safeguards for the privilege”). 
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here is a way to move the interrogation regime toward a role for defense counsel 
that comes closer to that envisioned by the majority in Miranda. 
